[Constitution as of 1949]

634 Art. 95. The Soviets of Working People's Deputies of administrative districts and their Executive Committees set up Departments and conduct their work on the basis of laws and decrees of supreme organs of the Russian SFSR and the decisions of territorial and regional Working People's Deputies.

632 Art. 96. The district Soviets of Working People's Deputies set up the following Departments of their Executive Committees:

- a Department of Roads
- a Department of Public Health
- a Department of Cultural and Educational Work
- a Department of Public Education
- a General Department
- a Department of Agriculture
- a Department of Social Maintenance
- a Department of Trade
- a Department of Finance
- a Planning Commission
- a Cadres Sector

under the Chairman of the Executive Committee and, in addition, in accordance with the specific features of the economy of the district, the district Soviets of Working People's Deputies set up the following Departments, subject to confirmation by the respective regional Soviets of Working People's Deputies:

- a Department of the Municipal Economy
- a Department of Local Industry.

629 Art. 97. The Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of State Security set up their Departments under the district Soviets of Working People's Deputies in accordance with the conditions of the district, on the basis of the laws of the USSR and the Russian SFSR and subject to confirmation by the corresponding regional Soviet of Working People's Deputies.

Art. 98. The Departments of the Executive Committees of district Soviets of Working People's Deputies are subordinate in their activities both to the district Soviets of Working People's Deputies and their Executive Committees and to the corresponding Departments of the territorial and regional Soviets of Working People's Deputies.

633 Art. 99. The city Soviets of Working People's Deputies set up the following Departments of their Executive Committees:

- a Department of Public Health
- a Department of the Municipal Economy
- a Department of Cultural and Educational Work
- a Department of Public Education
- a General Department
- a Department of Social Maintenance
- a Department of Trade
- a Department of Finance
- a Planning Commission
- a Cadres Sector

under the Chairman of the Executive Committee and, in addition, in accordance with the specific features of the city's industry and its municipal and suburban economy:

- a Department of Local Industry and
- a Department of Agriculture.

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subjects: coercion and dependency. One such method was to massacre a large part of the population, to loot the conquered territories, and to leave those that remained alive in abject misery. The plunder of the conquered peoples sometimes went to such extremes that they were exposed to prolonged famines and food had to be brought from Moscow to save the remaining populace from starving to death.

When a non-Russian territory had been brought to impotence by such means the Muscovite rulers would settle the Russian people among the natives, dividing the territory into a number of administrative units. The next step was to appoint persons who were strangers to those places to govern them. Following the Mongol pattern, these governors were changed often and never allowed to stay long enough to become friendly with the natives and to develop a genuine local power of their own. As a rule, in one and the same place two personages would be appointed, one of higher nobility to hold the office in name, and the other of lower nobility to control the former. Moreover, special overseers and watchdogs were periodically sent directly from Moscow to spy and check on both.[19]

This system of checking on persons who held high offices was practiced also in the army where large army units were headed by persons of the old high nobility, who were not trusted. To these nominal commanders, officers of lesser nobility would be appointed as deputy commanders. It was often these "political commissars" who had the real power.[20]

Just as in the tribes and states of the steppes the conquered people were kept in subjugation also by fomenting continual dissension between various classes and within each class of the population. The Czar at the same time relied on the numerical strength and loyalty of his personal guards and selected garrisons which were strategically distributed throughout the conquered country. The conquered people, brought thus by the conqueror to helplessness, fell to their knees and begged their overlords for mercy.

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not by means of a popular revolution as in the West. Accordingly the new bureaucratic rule was based on the *Ukaz*[3] and the knut as much as the old order. For the same reason, though the state was formally secularized, the traditions of an autocracy, divinely ordained and supported by God, were carried on by every official as the representative of the Czar.[4]

Therefore the new system of autocracy based on bureaucracy, the same as the old one based on service nobility, could not recognize any political or personal rights of the subjects. Nor could there have developed any *esprit de corps* among the new governing class. This new class of officials owned little or no land and had to live on meager salaries, but was eager to follow the traditions and the high standards established by the old landed nobility. The chinovnichestvo therefore became even more dependent upon the Czar than the dvorianstvo was earlier. There was even less *esprit de corps* and less solidarity in the new governing class than in the old. Each official was constantly in fear of jeopardizing his own social position if he stood up in defense of any of his colleagues. Besides, in this hierarchical system of power the ruin or falling into disfavor of one official often meant the ascendancy of the other. There was, therefore, a tendency to take advantage of such a situation, to resort to intrigues and calumnies, and to help to destroy rather than to rehabilitate a victim.

All the powers, the lawmaking, the application of law, and the justice were placed into the hands of these bureaucrats. At the same time the system of checks and controls was very deficient. Laws were enacted by special temporary commissions of high officials, and created *ad hoc*. The Council of State, a supreme policy-making body, composed of about seventy to eighty highest dignitaries, was appointed by the Czar to serve him only in advisory capacities. The final decision rested in the hands of the Czar, or with the camarilla clique which happened at the moment to be most influential. The Empire was administratively divided into provinces (*gubernia*) which were usually headed by army generals. The gubernias were divided into districts which were headed by chiefs of police. The governors, supported by the police, ruled autocratically in their domains. They were

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631 625 responsible only to the Czar; and the police, not being responsible to the public, but only to their immediate superiors, tended to be arbitrary.

647 What mattered in Russia's bureaucratic system was obedience to one's superiors. That was the primary criterion of judgment of the fitness of a civil servant, not his ability or personal integrity. Seldom was an employee dismissed because of corruption and injustice. A functionary could not be prosecuted for acts committed in the exercise of his functions except with the consent, or, on the initiative of his superiors. And the higher placed the offender, the less real was his responsibility. At the same time a subordinate employee, a soldier, or an inferior officer had no redress if wronged by his superior. A subordinate did have the right by law to lodge a complaint against mistreatment on the part of his chief, but according to the rules of Russian hierarchical discipline, no public servant, civil or military, could present a petition or complaint except through his own superior officer.[5] Few ever dared to do so.

647 871 This bureaucratic irresponsibility and impunity assumes an especial significance if one has in mind the low status of education and training of Russian officials. By the end of the nineteenth century in the provinces, according to an official investigation, out of a hundred employees, only one or two were found to have attended a university, five or six to have graduated from secondary schools, ten or twelve from primary schools. Eighty out of a hundred had had no formal schooling whatever and had passed no examination.[6] Many former soldiers and war veterans with little or no formal schooling crowded civil administration. At times the higher the education the less chances one had to enter state service.[7]

II

647 557 In such a system excess in zeal was often rewarded. On the other hand, initiative and originality, if not successful, were fraught with great personal risks. Therefore, shirking from work and responsibility, and struggling for office and rank became the rule. It was only by achieving higher position and by winning

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643 imagine himself threatened by "enemies," and live in fear.[14] As
157 a defense against such feelings the Czar might be inclined to follow the advice of those of his officials who favored concentration of power and who advised against giving up any of his prerogatives or against any yielding to the demands of the opposition. "Constitution" to such a Czar and his camarilla was as dangerous as "revolution."

But such policies, which are rooted in a sense of extreme insecurity themselves tend to strengthen such feelings. Mistrust of people, fear of the "enemies," suppression of all opposition and tendency to concentrate increasingly the power in one's hands, to dominate and to demand absolute submissiveness is therefore perpetuated. Hence, power-relations in Russia of the eighteenth and nineteenth century tended to follow the pattern of rule established earlier in Muscovite Czardom:

661 The emperor Nicholas I ruled his country like a gamekeeper. Under
643 his administration of the empire, based as it was upon a system
566 of flogging, imprisonment, and exile to Siberia, the great could indulge their caprices with impunity . . . But . . . in reality . . . the masters were also slaves. Every man, whoever he might be, was dependent on someone more powerful than himself who could with impunity make him wretched, and over him again there was someone still mightier. The lord, it is true, lived in comfort, and the serfs in squalor, but that was all. They were all slaves, one as much as the other . . . I have seen both oppressors and oppressed at close quarters, and I can aver that the inhuman regime of bondage corrupted and depraved one as much as the other.[15]

• 625 Just as in the political organization of steppe nomads and in the Muscovite Czardom such relations of insecurity, mistrust, self-seeking, abusive domineering and blind subordination demanded an efficient system of watchfulness, vigilance, checking and counterchecking. A special attention therefore had to be paid to the institution of secret political police. Since the days of Czar Nicholas I, the secret political police, known as the Third Section, was placed above all ministries, and was directly subject to the Emperor himself, just as in the days of Ivan the Terrible. Like the Oprichniki of Ivan the Terrible the Third Section was the main agency of vigilance, the chief watchdog of the state. It

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was invested with the most extensive powers and was given as its special mission the task of looking after the safety of the state and overseeing the doings of all departments, of all public functionaries, and of all people. The security police was an omnipotent and all-powerful body before whom all subjects were considered guilty unless they proved the contrary. This institution—developed in the course of centuries—became of paramount importance to its rulers. It became one of the most essential wheels of the government and one of the chief cares of the ruling class.[16]

III

Hierarchical relations of strict superordination and subordination in the military and bureaucratic ranks might foster feelings of identification with the mighty and the powerful. It is on such grounds that imperialistic nationalism and ideas of national superiority and grandeur thrive. And when state is fused with the Church in a system of theocratic militarism then nationalism might acquire also the aspects of religious fanaticism.

Expansion, greatness of the state, ideas of grandeur and Messianic ideas of world redemption or world domination might provide also compensation for humiliations, self-abasement, feelings of inferiority and unworthiness and other frustrations which are fostered in a system of abusive domineering-subservience relationships. As a result love of show, display of military might and need for conquests preoccupied the ruling strata of post-Petrine Russia as much as those of the Muscovite state. The Czar's court, the nobility, the military, the bureaucracy, the Church, the cities and the villages tended to display a grandeur that was in sharp contrast with the poverty of the country.[17]

This tendency toward exhibitionism and ideas of greatness was manifested also in the glorification of Russia, and the belief in the sacredness of its exalted mission in the world. Such attitudes and feelings which were rooted in the rigidly hierarchical military and bureaucratic structure were supported also by the Third Rome traditions of the Russian Church according to which Providence itself had bestowed upon Russia's rulers the role of the redeemers of mankind. According to these traditions and teachings Russia was a God-chosen country, the only country

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revolutionary organizations was approved whenever such an act was considered necessary to strike terror into the hearts of the followers or to knit them more closely together.[23] Equally good was considered to be the method of deception, not only of the public, but also of the followers. Moreover, in order to achieve revolution and destroy the existing order, it was considered necessary to increase the existing evils. "The society will use all its resources to increase and intensify the evils and miseries of the people . . ."[24] so that the people would lose patience and be stimulated to a mass rising.

III

The extent to which Nihilist and Anarchist ideas had penetrated into various strata of Russian society by the middle of the second part of the nineteenth century may be indicated by the police records revealed during the many trials of Anarchists and Terrorists. Thus in a trial of a group known as the "Nechaevtsy," out of approximately 150 conspirators, about 30 of them or 20% were classified as nobles, about 50 or 33% of the accused were classified as students and former students. About 20 or 13% were sons of priests and divinity students. About 40 or 26% belonged to the class of bureaucrats and the military. About 15 or 10% belonged to the class of merchants and petty traders. There were five peasants, one artisan and one janitor in the group. There were also about ten women, married and single. The overwhelming majority of the conspirators were between 20 and 26 years of age, the median age being 22.[25]

As a result of Anarchist propaganda and agitation a number of secret revolutionary groups were organized and became known collectively as *podpolie* (underground).[26] One of them was *Zemlya i Volya* (land and freedom), organized in the early seventies. This society split a few years later into two factions, a moderate one, and an openly terroristic group known as the *Narodnaya Volya* (the people's will).[27] The *Narodovoltsy* initiated a series of terroristic acts and assassinations of high officials, including a number of attempts on the life of Czar Alexander II.[28]

The Czarist police fought back with the same weapons. The

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secret police had completely free hands in hunting down the members of the Terrorist movement, using the same cunning means as the terrorists did. Each party relied on terror, based on the principle that all means were justified. One of the principal victims in this struggle was Czar Alexander II whose ideas and policies were aimed at liberalizing the Russian society and raising it to the economic and educational level that had been achieved in the European West.

As a reaction against this event, Alexander's son and successor, Alexander III, instituted officially a regime of terror and declared a ruthless war of extermination of all terrorists and other subversive elements. The Russian public opinion, too, shocked by the assassination of Alexander II, was becoming alert to the dangers of terrorist practices.[29] Such circumstances had a disheartening effect on terrorist plans. A number of revolutionaries found it expedient to move the center of their activities to European capitals. Other young malcontents endeavored to "go among the people" (*iti v narod*) and start mass agitation and propaganda. These *Narodniki* wanted also to raise the educational and economic standards of the lower strata of the Russian society, particularly the peasants who were to play a significant role in the coming events.

16
THE STRUCTURE OF VILLAGE COMMUNITY

I

BEFORE serfdom, the land commune (*mir*) whose function was to distribute land periodically, to collect taxes and maintain order, was also an institution which protected its members from outside interference. It was an institution made up of peasants who were not differentiated economically and who knew their own needs and capacities. In such village communities the Old-Slavonic traditions of mutual aid and egalitarian

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566 written or by customary rules of conduct and often exposed to the arbitrariness and mistreatment of their lords, the serfs on many manorial estates came to be completely dependent upon the will and capriciousness of their masters.

566 621 It is obvious that many landed gentry who were given such absolute rights over their serfs would tend to completely subjugate the mir also. In such circumstances the mir was likely to lose its character of a self-ruled and self-contained community and instead tended to become an instrument of landlord's power which made the landowner the absolute monarch of his estate. Under the overlordship of the estate owner the mir kept its watchful eye over every peasant, and made it easier for the landowner to manage his property, and for the government to rule the country. It was under such external pressures that the steppe traditions of an absolute, stern and distant patriarchal power were being strengthened among the peasantry.

II

565 651 621 [566] The conditions of the peasants did not improve in these respects after the abolishment of serfdom in the second part of the nineteenth century.[6] The peasants were emancipated from the rule of the pomeshchiks and subjected again directly to the government. But now the government, pushed by pressing demands for increasing revenues, made the mir an instrument of state control and found in it one of the most exacting of tax collectors. In order to be assured of payment the state had to concede to the mir all of the most severe measures of authority. [681] Now the mir was entitled to banish unsolvent peasants to Siberia. And when corporal punishment was abolished in urban criminal law practice, it was still left in use in the mir.[6]

625 621 After the abolishment of serfdom the mir came under the supervision of the district chief of police (*Ispravnik*). The law of 1874 gave the police the right to arrest and to fine the village elders, and even to demand from the governor of the province their discharge. [622] The position of the elder became so undesirable that the mir sometimes had to exert force to obtain candidates for this office or to prevent those in office from resigning.[7]

000 There was another official in this system of rural administra-

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623 a few kulaks were often able to force the commune members into unanimous decision by means of threats or bribing. And there was no appeal against such decisions.

565 In such circumstances many land communes tended to lose
621 their former equalitarian and protective aspects and the peasants
154 came to fear the mir and to feel an awe before it as much as they had a fear and awe before God and the Czar or before a stern and distant father. They feared the overwhelming power of the mir, the finality of its decision, and the lack of redress against its will They tended to identify the mir's final power with that of Almighty God. "There is no court for the mir, one God is its judge," they would say. Feeling helpless in the front of such an
[156] uncontrollable power, there seemed to be nothing else for the peasants to do but to submit to its will. "One cannot argue with the mir"; "Mir will stand for itself, you cannot go against it" they would say. And since there was no other way out for one but to be a part of such an overwhelming and capricious institution the most expedient way of behavior for him was to accept it and to do as the others do. "Although bad, you cannot do without it"; "If you have to live with wolves you might as well howl as they do."[11]

621 The mir and police were empowered to interfere not only in
● 625 the system of planting, sowing, and harvesting, but in family
156 and personal affairs as well. The problems of paternal authority and filial duties, the relations between husband and wife, and between in-laws, the questions of inheritance, military conscription, and general behavior, all were within the grasp of these village authorities.[12] Just as in his own family, the rank-and-file individual was completely lost in his village commune. A rank-and-file man had the right to participate in the debates and was expected to vote unanimously for the regulations which restricted his personal and his economic freedom. He who dared to object was unprotected against the despotism and arbitrariness either of the ruling minority or of an incited mob. Thus the feelings of complete dependence upon superior powers prevailed in the community.

241 In addition, poor quality of land, lack of sufficient moisture, long and hard winters, many years of military service, low

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had to pay for religious services. In addition many village priests had an inferior training, were often semi-literate, and were sometimes publicly humiliated by their superiors. Abased by hard conditions of life, some of them tended to lose self-respect and sought comfort in habitual drunkenness.

In the meantime as a result of the conditions of serfdom the economic situation of the peasants was deteriorating while the village priests whose main revenues consisted of fees received for their services tended to squeeze out of the peasantry all they could. Hence in many parishes the relations between the priests and the peasants gradually developed into a state of perpetual bickering and struggle.[1] In such circumstances peasants were likely to develop a negative attitude toward the clergy. To "have a priest's eye" meant in peasant idiom to covet everything. Similar meaning was conveyed in the phrase "Am I a priest to eat two dinners?" The peasants compared the greediness of the priests to that of the judges. "A priest waits for a rich dead, and a judge for a rich litigant"; "A judge's pocket is the same as a priest's belly," they would say. It was considered a bad omen to meet a priest on the street. It must be pointed out, also, that in a situation in which any expression of opposition against the lay authorities was very risky and dangerous, the attack against the priests might have served as a convenient substitute target for destructive aggression directed against the landlords and the state.

In such conditions government ukases and police measures were sometimes necessary to force the peasants into churches; they were made to confess and to take communion by means of threat. As a result, confession and communion tended to be looked upon as a commercialized formality. It was a tedious obligation that had to be paid for in cash, the same as all other tributes and taxes to which the peasants were subjected. In such circumstances, confession and communion tended to lose their function of consolation, comfort, relief from guilt and identification with divinity. As a result a growing number of peasants ceased to look upon the priests as their friends and protectors; they tended to look upon them as government agents who conspired with the landlords and the police against the

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and consciousness of people. . . ."[20] The Soviet court is to accomplish this task "by destroying without pity all the foes of the people in whatsoever form they manifest their criminal encroachments upon socialism."[21]

One of the chief watchdogs in such use of the law and of the court is the Prosecutor General of the USSR. In this function as the main overseer in the application of Soviet law the office of the Prosecutor General is empowered "upon its own initiative" to interfere on all the levels of juridical procedure, including even the decisions of the Supreme Court. The Prosecutor's office is therefore defined as "Inseparably integrated with the court—an organ of state authority obligated to oversee that socialist legality is observed."[22] The Prosecutor's office initiates criminal proceedings and has also the right to initiate a civil court proceeding. It also supervises the fulfillment of court sentences.

In this manner the office of the Prosecutor General has become the main instrument in preventing any local opposition to or local deviation from the application of law. To best perform this role of strict legal uniformity the office of the Prosecutor General had to be highly centralized, made independent of local organs of authority, while in close contact and under the strict supervision of the highest organs of the Party's hierarchy.[23] In this way the Public Prosecutor has become a means of the "uniform conception of justice" (*edinocbraznoe ponimanie zakonnosti*), "an instrument of political power" (*orudie ukreplenia gosudarstva*), and an agent of "moral-political unity" (*moralno-politicheskoe edinstvo*).[24] By enforcing strict application of the letter of the law, the top Party leaders have been enabled to keep the republic, the regional and the local government agencies, the municipal bureaucracies, and the industrial and farm managements from any deviations in the application of law.[25]

Another significant instrument of political conformity in Soviet society is the institution of the political police. In accordance with its tradition this institution specializes in intelligence, vigilance and violence. It complements all other instruments of conformity and functions as an omnipresent and omniscient power which sleeplessly watches over the private and the public life of every Soviet citizen at home and abroad. The

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625 political police is under direct supervision of the supreme Party leader himself and is always headed only by one of his most trusted advisers. In a system of prison-like regimentation of all the subjects, a distrustful and fierce ruling faction of professional conspirators can never relax in their watchfulness and must act swiftly and without regard for legal formalities, or for personal or human considerations in stamping out and annihilating all signs of opposition to its rule.

Early in the history of the Bolshevik regime the secret Political Police came to be so indispensable that this institution was identified with the Party. "Every good Communist should be a good Chekist," said Lenin. By the end of 1918 the Cheka (*Chrezvychaynaya Komissiya*) had been reorganized from an organ of investigation into an organ that also resorted directly to "extra judicial measures of coercion, assuring swift and of necessity, cruel repression of the enemies of the Soviet state." In 1922 Cheka, whose terror became too odious, was abolished and supplanted by the G.P.U. which was characterized by Stalin as "the indefatigable guardian of the Revolution, the unsheathed sword of the proletariat."[26] To inform not only on non-Communists but on the members of his own Party and even on the members of his or her own family, became one of the first duties of every Party member.[27] Refusal to inform came to be considered as conspiracy against the Party and the state. A dense net of secret agents and informers became instrumental in preventing social intimacy and strengthening lack of trust.

625 672 Following age-long practices of Czarist rule and traditions of mutual responsibility of family members the Soviet political police uses the family members of political suspects as hostages.[28] Any person who had any dealings or connection with a political suspect, even in a most casual or incidental way, becomes *ipso facto* himself a suspect.[29] In Soviet police philosophy and practice every subject is a suspect as an offender or potential criminal unless he proves his innocence. A distrustful and violent ruling clique which is determined to perpetuate itself in power by all and any means must stamp out any opposition regardless of how many non-guilty ones might suffer. An important objective of the political police is therefore to instill fear and terror in the

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hearts of the Soviet subjects and to exert unremitting pressure on them, so that they never relax in their striving to conform to the Party's will. The secret police, in Lenin's words, is "our weapon of assault upon innumerable conspiracies . . . innumerable attempts against Soviet authority."[20]

625 672

23
CONTROL OF THOUGHT AND FEELING

MONOPOLIZATION of all social power by the Bolshevik rulers and their failure to satisfy the traditional demands for equality and acceptance has been breeding both apathy and latent rebellion in Soviet society. Realizing that such a development might eventually undermine their power, early in their rule the Bolsheviks proceeded to indoctrinate the thoughts and to control the feelings of their subjects. It became imperative to evoke identification of the masses with Bolshevik leadership and gain their faith, enthusiasm and willing self-sacrifice in support of the Soviet system.[1]

626 208

In order to justify this need for ideological and emotional conformity, it became necessary to monopolize the Truth. The Bolsheviks therefore stated that all problems, those of the past and of the present, as well as those of the future, have found their answer in Marxist-Leninist theory. They asserted, however, that since this theory "is not a dogma, but a guide to action,"[2] the Bolshevik leadership is "able to enrich this theory with the new propositions and conclusions, . . . to *develop it and advance* it" and "to replace such of its propositions and conclusions as have become antiquated by new ones corresponding to the new historical situation."[3] And just as earlier the Russian Orthodox Church had claimed to represent the "true Christianity" centered in Moscow, the Third Rome, so now the Bolshevik rulers have usurped for themselves the right to represent the "true Marxism," centered in the Kremlin:

[771] 829

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[Ivan the Terrible]

convict labor, indicate that the number of such children will not decrease in the foreseeable future.[26]

Such children are considered to have an ideal background for their training as future specialists in conspiracy, vigilance, and violence. Therefore the children who have been raised in a tense family atmosphere or who have been rejected and neglected by their families form a fertile ground from which the Bolshevik rulers recruit a significant part of their future followers and leaders. But what is the future of a society whose ruling classes are being formed out of persons who have been raised in the midst of harshness, brutality and lack of human warmth or whose desire for emotional attachment has been thwarted?

By the middle of the sixteenth century Ivan the Terrible, who himself was left motherless early in his childhood and was exposed to great instability in his emotional attachments, became a victim of ideas of persecution and of boundless and insatiable thirst for power and self aggrandizement. Driven by such compulsions he undertook to organize a body of fanatical devotees who were bound by oath to forswear association not only with "friends and brethren" but even with their own parents, and to serve the Czar blindly and unconditionally. These *Oprichniki* became renowned in history as a brotherhood of brigands who lived separated and isolated from the rest of society—"men vile and filled with every sort of cruelty."[27] Throughout the day they indulged in savage torturing and killing of suspects after they had attended the morning liturgy. In their wild outrages they terrorized peaceful citizens immediately after their brow-beating prostrations before the Altar.

In the same manner in the Ottoman Empire, the elite militia of the Sultans, known as the Janizaries, were recruited from among the children who were often early in their childhood or boyhood taken away from their parents to be raised and trained in loyalty to the Sultan only. Still earlier in the society of Eurasian steppe warriors want of bonds of human attachment brought about instability and explosiveness of Asiatic empires. Both the Asiatic conquerors and the Janizaries became renowned in history for their recklessness and barbarism. They also rebelled and excelled in insubordination to established

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There is also a deliberate policy on the part of the ruling class
177 626 609 to prevent personal contact and exchange of ideas between the Soviet subjects and the foreigners. In this way the Bolshevik Party is performing the same role in the social and psychological development of Russia as the Orthodox Church has done in the past. Xenophobia and a deliberate avoidance of strangers easily develops in such circumstances, traits which have been noticed by all the observers of Soviet society. Xenophobia is so outstanding in the Soviet world that it has been noticed even by the most casual and most friendly visitors. Soviet authorities have done their best to encourage this feeling. "We were completely cut off
●[625] from the great bulk of the Russian people by constant police surveillance, by propaganda and by the threat of punishment."[7] "The air itself was clothed with hate and suspicion . . . penetrated even to the child world. . . . Our next door neighbours, too, were grilled, and though we had known them for years, they took to avoiding us utterly."[8] As a rule, only police informers are assigned to foreigners as servants because everyone else is afraid to work for them.

517 647 In such conditions original ideas and independent intellectual pursuits are fraught with great risks and it is often the less original, the mediocre, the cynical, the shrewd and the unscrupulous that take the lead. Some independent and creative people in such circumstances tend to become apathetic, to withdraw, to sever social contacts and put an end to their creative activities.[9] Others tend to seek safety in bureaucratic routine and in avoidance of initiative and responsibility. For each decision they tend to cover themselves by presenting the matter to various committees, or by seeking the Party's advice, thus letting others shoulder the responsibility.

517 665 The social consequences of such a development are then manifested in a pronounced anti-intellectualism, bureaucratism and vigilantism. The ascendancy of anti-intellectualistic and watchdog trends in Soviet society is well expressed, for instance, in the change in the composition of the membership of the Politbure. In this topmost ruling body the more intellectual types of revolutionaries have been gradually purged and replaced by the activists, the semi-educated professional conspirators, Party organizers, agitators and former security officials.